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IV 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20050415-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(5) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Is Utah's communications fraud statute unconstitutionally 
overbroad on its face? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). Whether a statute is unconstitutionally 
overbroad is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Provo City Corp. v. 
Thompson, 2004 UT 14,15,86 P.3d 735. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud—Elements—Penalties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) 
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except 
as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk 
over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State charged defendant with one count of communications fraud or, 
in the alternative, one count of identity theft for his participation in a scheme to 
defraud Utah Valley Regional Medical Center out of payment for medical 
services (R. 1-2). Defendant moved to dismiss the communications fraud charge, 
asserting that it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Art. 1, § 15 of the Utah 
Constitution (R. 59-69). The district court denied defendant's motion (R. 
198:132). A jury convicted defendant of second degree felony communications 
fraud (R. 144; 198:221). 
On April 30, 2003, the court sentenced defendant to sixty days in jail and 
ordered him to pay restitution of $6,041.41 (R.146-50). Defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal to the court of appeals and renewed in that court his claims that 
the statute was overbroad and vague both on its face and as applied to him (R. 
152). 
The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction. See State v. 
Mattinson, 2005 UT App 155, 2005 WL 729648 (unpublished memorandum 
decision). With respect to defendant's facial challenges to the statute, the court 
followed its earlier decision in State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,97 P.3d 732, cert. 
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granted, 106 P.3d 743, upholding the communications fmud statute against facial 
vagueness and overbreadth challenges. See id. at 1. The court then ruled that 
defendant's claim that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him was 
inadequately briefed. See id. at 2. It also decided that even if the court were to 
reach defendant's as-applied claims, it would reject them because defendant's 
"conduct clearly fell into an area prohibited by the statute/' Id. At 3. 
This Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider whether "the 
Communications Fraud Statute, Utah Code Ann. 76-10-1801, is 
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face." Order of August 18, 2005, Case No. 
20050415-SC. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On December 10, 2001, defendant took his girlfriend, Stevoni Wells, to the 
emergency room of the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center to have her treated 
for spinal meningitis (R. 198:51, 97, 99, 141-4). Wells had a fever of 105 degrees 
and was delirious (R. 198:97, 102). She could later recall few details about the 
process of checking into the emergency room (R. 198:102). She did remember, 
however, that she checked in under a false name, Stacy Sorenson (R. 198: 99-100). 
Wells later admitted that she used a fake name to escape paying the medical bill 
and to prevent her arrest on any outstanding warrants (R. 198:104,107-08). 
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Because Wells was delirious, defendant helped admit her to the hospital. 
Defendant and Wells jointly represented to the triage nurse that they were 
married (R. 198:145). Defendant told the hospital admissions staff that Wells's 
maiden name was Wall (R. 147). Defendant also signed Wells's admission form 
"Jeremy Sorenson" and identified himself as Wells's "spouse" (R. 198:148; State's 
Ex. No. 1). The personal information on the admission form, including 
defendant's and Wells's names, addresses, phone numbers, social security 
numbers, and employment information, was all false (R. 198:72, 75-76, 100-02; 
State's Ex. No. 1). The admission form indicated that both the patient and the 
person who signed the form were responsible for the hospital bill (R. 198:79; 
State's Ex. No. 1). Wells never paid her $5,867.83 bill, and the hospital was 
unable to collect on the bill because of the false personal information Wells and 
defendant provided (R. 198:70-73; State's Ex. No. 4). 
Wells later confessed, as part of a guilty plea to forgery, that she lied to the 
hospital to avoid paying her medical bills and to prevent anyone from 
discovering that she had outstanding warrants for her arrest (R. 198:99, 107-08). 
Defendant maintained that he was not concerned about the medical bills or the 
arrest warrants, but lied only so that the hospital would allow him to remain 
with Wells during her treatment (R. 198:153,158). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The communications fraud statute is not overbroad on its face. A statute is 
facially overbroad only if it prohibits a substantial amount of conduct protected 
by the First Amendment. Utah's communications fraud statute prohibits only 
false statements made intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Such falsehoods 
receive no First Amendment protection. 
Moreover, the communications fraud statute prohibits only statements that 
are capable of being objectively proved true or false. Thus, the opinions or 
position statements of political candidates, newspaper editors, and the like are 
not subject to the statute. Nor are the statements of advertisers who engage in 
puffery or praise of their wares. The statute only regulates the communication of 
factual statements made as part of a scheme to defraud another or to obtain 
something of value. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT 
OVERBROAD UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals rejected defendant's facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute by relying on its earlier 
decision in State v. Norris, in which it held "that the communications fraud 
statute is not overbroad on its face." Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ff 7-11. The 
court observed in Norris that the statute does not prohibit all falsehoods or 
material omissions, as argued by defendant, "only those where an individual 
seeks fto defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything 
of value.'" Id. at f 11 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-104801(1) (1999)). 
The Norris court also noted that the statute prohibits only those falsehoods 
or material omissions that are "'made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(7)). The Court observed that the statute thus "draws the distinction 
between criminal and innocent behavior" with a mens rea consistent with the 
standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 
(1964). Norris, 2004 UT App 267,111. As such, the court concluded, section 76-
10-1801 is not substantially overbroad and should not be invalidated. Id. 
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The court of appeals1 decision in Norris is currently before this Court in 
State v. Norris, case number 20040880-SC, and State v. Norris, case number 
20041118-SC. If this Court upholds the communications fraud statute in those 
cases, it should do likewise in the instant case. 
A. The Overbreadth Doctrine, 
As a general rule, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be 
applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be 
applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court." New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982[Jeffrey S2]). However, this traditional rule 
of "standing" has been altered by the U.S. Supreme Court "to permit—in the 
First Amendment area—'attacks on overly broad statutes . . . . ' " Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973[Jeffrey S3]) (citation omitted). As recently 
explained by this Court, the First Amendment exception for overly broad 
statutes "'gives a defendant standing to challenge a statute on behalf of others 
not before the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the 
defendant.'" Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 1 10, 86 P.3d 735 
(quoting Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,1263 n.2 (Utah App. 1997)). 
The overbreadth doctrine stems from the concern that "'persons whose 
expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their 
right [to free speech] for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute 
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susceptible of application to protected expression.'" Los Angeles Police Dep't v. 
United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999) (citation omitted). "Because 
these individuals are never prosecuted, the overbroad statute [would go] 
unchallenged." Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 11. The overbreadth doctrine 
remedies this "chilling effect" on expression, permitting "a party [to] challenge a 
statute on the basis that it criminalizes protected speech even though that party's 
own conduct or speech is not constitutionally protected." Id. 
The overbreadth doctrine "is, manifestly, strong medicine" because it 
"totally forbid[s]" enforcement of a law which otherwise targets "harmful, 
constitutionally unprotected conduct." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615. As a 
result, it "is not [employed] casually," United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 39, but 
"sparingly and only as a last resort," Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. "The scope of 
the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most exceptions to established 
principles, must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial 
invalidation of a statute is truly warranted." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769. 
Because the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine, those who challenge 
a statute as overbroad carry a "heavy burden." McConnell v. Federal Election 
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003). To prevail, an overbreadth claimant must 
demonstrate that "(1) the statute 'reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct,' even if the statute also has a legitimate application, and (2) 
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the statute is not 'readily subject to a narrowing construction.'" Thompson, 2004 
UT 14, I 11 (quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987), and State v. 
Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280,1284 (Utah 1983) (other citations omitted)). 
B. Application of Overbreadth Doctrine to Section 76-10-1801. 
Section 76-10-1801(1) provides: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of 
value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of 
[communications fraud]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). At the outset, therefore, section 76-10-1801 falls 
within those statutes that prohibit "conduct—even if expressive—fall[ing] within 
the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in 
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected 
conduct/7 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). Defendant 
recognizes as much, conceding that "the government has a legitimate interest in 
deterring and prosecuting fraud." Pet. Brf. at 22. "Although such laws, if too 
broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there 
comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, 
justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing 
the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe." 
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Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. Such is the case with section 76-10-1801. Indeed, a 
review of the statute reveals that there is no overbreadth. 
1. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Falsehoods Made 
Intentionally, Knowingly, or With Reckless Disregard for the 
Truth. 
The paramount question here is whether the communications fraud statute 
can "conceivably be applied" to prohibit constitutionally protected conduct or 
expression. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982). It cannot, for it 
prohibits only those falsehoods or material omissions that are "made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). Such falsehoods enjoy no First Amendment protection. 
The First Amendment affords a measure of protection to "some" 
falsehoods in order to provide the breathing space necessary for the exercise of 
fully protected speech, or "speech that matters." BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 
536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 
(1974)) (emphasis added in BE & K). Nevertheless, "[u]ntruthful speech, 
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Virginia 
State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
(1976Qeffrey S6]). As a result, certain classes of speech "hajye] never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem." Chaplinsky v. State of New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). Falsehoods uttered intentionally, 
11 
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for their truth fall within one of those 
unprotected classes. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does 
not permit civil recovery for a defamatory falsehood unless "the [false] statement 
was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 279—80 (1964). The court of appeals here concluded that because 
the mens rea requirement for communications fraud is consistent with that 
required under New York Times, the statute "cannot be said [to be] 'substantially 
overbroad:" Norris, 2004 UT App 267, J 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458). 
Defendant challenges this conclusion, arguing that the New York Times mens rea 
standard "is clearly limited to its civil context and has no bearing upon the 
constitutionality of a criminal statute that proscribes speech, including § 76-10-
1801." Pet. Brf. at 20. Defendant's argument is wrong. 
In Garrison v. Louisiana—issued the same year as New York Times—the U.S. 
Supreme addressed whether the New York Times mens rea standard for civil libel 
cases also applies in the criminal context. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67. It concluded 
that it does. Id. Garrison recognized that "even where [an] utterance is false, the 
great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this 
area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the knowing or 
12 
reckless/' Id. at 73 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the reasons 
which led to the knowing or reckless requirement in New York Times "apply with 
no less force merely because the remedy is criminal/' Id. at 74. The Court thus 
held that "[t]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel 
application of the same standard to the criminal remedy." Id. 
Although Garrison involved a criminal libel statute, the Supreme Court's 
analysis made clear that knowing or reckless falsehoods enjoy no First 
Amendment protection, whatever the context. The Court recognized that an 
inaccurate but honest utterance contributes to the "fruitful exercise of the right of 
free speech." Id. at 75. On the other hand, calculated falsehoods "put a different 
cast on the constitutional question" because such falsehoods are "at once at odds 
with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in 
which economic, social, or political change is to be effected." Id. The Court thus 
concluded that "[calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which 
'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'" Id. (quoting 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). "Hence," the Court held, "the knowingly false 
statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do 
not enjoy constitutional protection/' Id. (emphasis added). 
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Garrison is controlling. As observed by the Court of Appeals in Norris, the 
communications fraud statute imposes criminal sanctions only where the 
falsehoods are made "intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth/7 Norris, 2004 UT App 267, J 11 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(7)). Garrison held that such speech enjoys no First Amendment protections. 
Accordingly, and regardless of any additional element that may define or limit 
the offense, "it cannot be said that [the communications statute] is 'substantially 
overbroad1...." Norris, 2004 UT App 267,f11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458). 
2. The "Anything of Value" Provision Does Not Render the 
Communications Fraud Statute Overbroad. 
Relying on Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), defendant claims 
that the communications fraud statute is overbroad because it requires no "clear 
and present danger" or harm. Pet. Brf. at 20. Specifically, he argues that because 
the object of the fraud can be anything of value, the "spectrum of constitutionally 
protected communications . . . is only as broad as the imagination" and thus 
encompasses fraudulent schemes that create no clear and present danger or 
harm. Pet. Brf. at 33. He argues, for example, that the statute prohibits a 
knowing or reckless falsehood made to preserve a good grade, Pet. Brf. at 17 (by 
claiming that "my dog ate my homework"), to receive a kiss, Pet. Brf. at 17, (by 
saying, "You don't look fat in that dress"), to avoid an unwanted outcome, Pet. 
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Brf. at 19 (e.g., an arrest), to obtain votes, Pet. Brf. at 32—33 (by misrepresenting 
position on abortion), or to increase sales, Pet. Brf. at 33 (by puffery in 
advertising). This claim is meritless. 
(a) The Principle That Intentional, Knowing, and Reckless 
Falsehoods Are Not Protected Is Dispositive. 
As noted, falsehoods made intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly are not 
protected, whatever the object of the fraud. It is therefore irrelevant how the 
statute limits the object of the fraud. Whether the object of the fraud is a kiss, a 
vote, avoiding arrest, or some other thing of arguable value is irrelevant, because 
an intentional, knowing, or reckless falsehood is not protected. Defendant's 
challenge to the "anything of value" provision thus fails. 
(b) In Any Event, the State May Prohibit Frauds Aimed at 
Depriving Persons of Intangible Rights or Interests. 
Defendant's reliance on Schenk and its progeny, including Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), is misplaced. The "clear and present danger" test 
articulated in Schenck and Dennis has evolved into the Brandenburg "incitement" 
test.1 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 778 
Under the rule articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 
(1969) (per curiam), "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 
15 
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring)); United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 397 n.3 
(10th Cir. 1999). And that test only applies to laws that forbid the advocacy of 
violence or the violation of law. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S at 447; United States v. 
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 922 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996). The communications fraud 
statute is not such a law. 
The correct test under the overbreadth doctrine is simply whether "the 
statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct/' 
Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 1 11 (quotations omitted). Defendant tries to show 
overbreadth by parading examples before this Court of how the communications 
fraud statute infringes on protected conduct. See supra pages 14-15. But 
defendant's examples do not demonstrate overbreadth because they either are 
not prohibited by the communications fraud statute or do not involve protected 
conduct under the First Amendment. 
For example, defendant's hypothetical political candidate who lies about 
his position on abortion has not committed communications fraud. This Court 
has recognized that the question of whether a candidate misrepresented his 
position is not capable of objective verification and, hence, cannot form the basis 
of a conviction for communications fraud. See West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 
P.2d 999,1019 (Utah 1994) ("Whether West actually intended to dupe voters into 
electing him mayor by misrepresenting his position on municipal power is 
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something only West himself knows, not something that is subject to objective 
verification/'). Likewise, the statement, "You don't look fat in that dress/' is an 
opinion that is incapable of objective verification. 
Defendant's hypothetical example of the advertiser who claims "that 
drinking beer makes people happy and attractive" is likewise inapplicable. "[I]t 
is irrelevant whether the ordinance has an overbroad scope encompassing 
protected commercial speech of other persons, because the overbreadth doctrine 
does not apply to commercial speech." See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,496-97 (1982). 
Statements that can be proved true or false are punishable as 
communications fraud so long as the statement was part of a scheme to defraud 
or for the purpose of obtaining something of value. The crime of fraud need not 
be limited to obtaining money or property. "[T]he common law criminalized 
frauds beyond those involving 'tangible rights'" and "'the crime of fraud has 
often included deceptive seduction, although that crime often includes no 
property or monetary loss.'" McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371 (1987) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).2 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that 
In McNally, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the federal mail fraud 
statute was limited to those frauds aimed at causing deprivation of property or 
money; it did not include fraudulent schemes designed to deprive persons of 
17 
"[fraudulent misrepresentations can be prohibited" and that penal laws can be 
enacted "to punish such conduct directly." Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Envt, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980). This power is not limited to those frauds 
involving money or property. 
Thus, a student who lies to a teacher in order to obtain more time to 
complete an assignment or to earn a better grade could be held legally 
accountable. He cannot hide behind the First Amendment merely because the 
object of his falsehood is an intangible benefit. Similarly, the Legislature has 
properly prohibited falsehoods that obstruct justice such as lying to a police 
officer about one's identity. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (West 2004) (defining 
crime of obstructing justice that prohibits providing false information about a 
suspect or witness during a criminal investigation); Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-506 
(West 2004) (prohibiting giving false information to a police officer to induce the 
officer to believe that another has committed an offense). That the 
intangible rights or interests, as in the right to have public officials perform their 
duties honestly. Id. at 358-60. This conclusion, however, was based on the 
Court's reading of the statute, not on any constitutional limitation. Indeed, the 
Court invited Congress to amend the law if it wished to expand mail fraud to 
those schemes involving intangible rights or interests. Id. at 360 (acknowledging 
that "[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has" in 
the current statute). Congress did so the following year. 18 U.S.C. 1346 (1988) 
(providing that "the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or 
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services"). 
18 
communications fraud statute prohibits falsehoods communicated to attain an 
intangible benefit does not demonstrate overbreadth because such falsehoods do 
not enjoy First Amendment protection. Accordingly, this Court should hold that 
the communications fraud statute is not overbroad on its face, and affirm 
defendant's conviction.3 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted November 7,2005. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D.BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
3
 This Court granted certiorari only to consider "[w]hether the 
Communications Fraud statute . . . is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face." 
To the extent that defendant argues in his brief that the statute violates his First 
Amendment rights or is unconstitutionally vague, the arguments are outside the 
scope of this Court's certiorari grant, and this Court should refuse to consider 
them. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) ((noting that this Court 
will review on certiorari "'[ojnly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly 
included therein' and for which certiorari is granted.") (quoting Utah R. App. P. 
49(a)(4)). 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on November 7, 2005, I served two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent upon the defendant/petitioner, Richard Jeremy 
Mattinson, by causing them to be delivered by first class mail to his counsel of 
record as follows: 
Jennifer Gowans 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
-f^ 
20 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 3 1 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard Jeremy Mattinson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030474-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 3 1 , 2 0 0 5 ) 
2005 UT App 155 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
Attorneys: Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Thorne. 
THORNE, Judge: 
Richard Jeremy Mattinson appeals his conviction of one count 
of communications fraud, a second degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2001). We affirm. 
Mattinson challenges the constitutionality of section 76-10-
1801, both on its face and as it was applied to him. However, we 
recently determined that section 76-10-1801 was facially valid, 
and thus not subject to broad attack on either vagueness or 
overbreadth grounds. See State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,^8-
16, 97 P.3d 732, cert, granted, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2004). 
Mattinson has not presented us with any reason to believe that 
Norris was clearly erroneous; consequently, we reject his claim 
that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. See State v, 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (stating that under 
the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis, "although it may not do 
so lightly, a panel may overrule its own or another panel's 
decision where the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions 
have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable" 
(quotations and citation omitted))/ State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) ("Although the doctrine is typically 
thought of when a single-panel appellate court is faced with a 
prior decision from the same court, stare decisis has equal 
application when one panel of a multi-panel appellate court is 
faced with a prior decision of a different panel."). 
Mattinson also argues that the statute is unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague "as applied" to this case. We note first 
that Mattinson's argument fails to comport with rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate procedure because he failed to present or 
develop any authority that might support his claim.1 See State 
v. Green, 2004 UT 76,^11-15, 99 P.3d 820 (discussing the 
requirements of rule 24 and the effect of an appellant's failure 
to comply with the rule). "'It is well established that a 
reviewing court will not address arguments that are not 
adequately briefed.'" Id. at fl5 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 
P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998)). Consequently, we decline to 
entertain Mattinson1s "as applied" argument. However, even if we 
were to examine this claim on its merits, the outcome would 
remain unchanged. 
When analyzing an "as applied" challenge to a criminal 
statute, we focus first on "whether the statute is sufficiently 
definite to have adequately warned [the defendant] that his 
conduct was proscribed." Id. at 1(4 6. *f w e conclude that it is 
sufficiently definite, we then "examine whether the statute is 
sufficiently definite so as to discourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement," which requires that the statute 
"establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement such that 
it avoids entrusting lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment 
of the policeman on his beat." Id. at 1J50 (quotations and 
citations omitted). Finally, we note that our examination must 
focus "on the particular conduct at hand and not on the possible 
conduct of hypothetical parties." Id. at f51. 
Section 76-10-1801 prohibits the act of communicating 
information, either directly or indirectly, to a person "by any 
means for the purpose of executing a scheme or artifice" to 
defraud another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1) ,2 The gravity 
1. Mattinson presents two cases--both of which center on cruel 
and unusual punishment--to support his "as applied" argument. 
Not only are these cases misplaced, but Mattinson neither 
presented, nor preserved, any cruel and unusual punishment 
argument below. Therefore, we do not address his cruel and 
unusual punishment claim on appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74,1(11, 10 P. 3d 346 ("As a general rule, claims not raised 
before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."). 
2. The scheme or artifice to defraud must involve a 
communication that contains "false or fraudulent pretenses, 
(continued...) 
2 
of the offense will be determined, in general, by the monetary 
value sought through the scheme or artifice to defraud. See id. 
§ 76-10-1801 (1) (a) - (d) .3 In State v. Norris we defined each of 
the material statutory terms expressed above and determined that 
these terms were best defined by their plain meanings. See 2004 
UT App 267 at ff13-15. Applying the plain meaning to the instant 
case, we conclude that the statutory language is sufficiently 
clear to have put Mattinson on notice that his conduct violated 
the statute. Consequently, we turn our analysis to determining 
whether the statute is drafted to preclude law enforcement from 
becoming ad-hoc lawmakers. See Green, 2004 UT 76 at 1f50. 
Here, Mattinson took his friend Stovoni Wells to the Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center when she exhibited symptoms of 
meningitis. The two agreed that she would be registered under a 
false name; that he would represent himself as her husband, also 
using a false name; and that any personal information required by 
the hospital would also be false. Mattinson then carried out 
this plan, completing all of the hospital forms with false 
information, including the form in which he guaranteed, jointly 
and severally with Wells, payment of all costs incurred as a 
result of Wells's hospitalization. The eventual costs of Wells's 
medical care amounted to over $5000. When Wells was later 
arrested, apparently on a different matter, she confessed to her 
participation in this scheme, implicated Mattinson, and stated 
that she had provided false information to avoid paying the 
medical costs associated with her hospitalization. Under these 
circumstances, Mattinson's conduct clearly fell into an area 
prohibited by the statute, and we cannot say that police 
officials were improperly left to "decide, in their discretion, 
that the statute's provisions should not apply." Id., 2004 UT 76 
2 . (. ..continued) 
representations, promises, or material omissions." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (2001). 
3. Mattinson argues that his conviction arose under section 76-
10-1801(1)(e), which criminalizes conduct where "the object of 
the scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of 
something of monetary value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(e) 
(2001). Although the State presented evidence that Mattinson may 
have been seeking a nonmonetary goal with his scheme or artifice 
to defraud, i.e., assisting Wells's efforts to avoid arrest, the 
State also presented ample evidence that the scheme or artifice 
to defraud centered on avoiding Wells's medical expenses. 
Consequently, we focus our analysis on Mattinson's avoidance of 
the medical costs and leave for another day any analysis of 
section 76-10-1801(1)(e). 
20030474-CA 3 
a t 1 5 2 Therefore, we reject Mattinson's "as applied" challenge 
to section 76-10-1801. 
Accordingly, Mattinson's conviction is affirmed. 
LM^L, 
Wi-lliam A. Thome Jr. , ^ Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
m 
jtfdith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
^ ^ ^ 
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ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on May 5, 2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue: 
Whether the Communications Fraud Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801, is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
Date 
y/«/-1% P,CS6 
FOR THE COURT: 
Christine M. Durham' 
Chief Justice 
fS y 
